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Equity - some theory and its policy
implications
Anthony J Culyer University of York
Abstract
This essay seeks to characterise the essential features of
an equitable health care system in terms of the classical
Aristotelian concepts of horizontal and vertical equity,
the common (but ill-defined) language of “need” and
the economic notion of cost-eVectiveness as a prelude to
identifying some of the more important issues of value
that policy-makers will have to decide for themselves;
the characteristics of health (and what determines it)
that can cause policy to be ineVective (or have
undesired consequences); the information base that is
required to support a policy directed at securing greater
equity, and the kinds of research (theoretical and
empirical) that are needed to underpin such a policy.
Keywords: Health care systems; equity; horizontal equity;
vertical equity; cost-eVectiveness
Theoretical discussions of equity are often dis-
tanced from the practical world of policy. In this
essay, an attempt is made to bridge the gap. Equity
in health care policy, as in other arenas of policy, is
a question of ethics and therefore of values. I am
not concerned here with descriptive ethics (which
depicts the values people seem to hold but which is
a research area that is too neglected) but with ana-
lytical ethics (which asks what we ought to do).
The focus is on equity in the allocation of health
care resources. I am therefore concerned with
questions like: “what is an equitable distribution of
the available health care resources among residents
of a country?”; “is the present distribution of health
care resources in my country equitable?”, and “how
might the distribution be made more equitable?”
These are value-laden questions because any idea
of “equity” must embody value judgments about
what it is that makes for a good society. At the same
time, the questions generate empirical questions of
fact if they are to have policy-relevance. We are
likely to want to know what the present distribution
of resources is and we may even want to know, as a
matter of fact, what it is that ordinary people think
about that distribution. There are, of course, values
underlying the reason for asking such factual ques-
tions and many of them relate to equity. But the
questions themselves are not ones of value. To
determine whether they have been satisfactorily
answered requires judgments that are not value-
judgments, for example, whether the number of
hospital beds counted in England and Wales is
accurate or whether the population sampled was
representative of the groups whose opinions were
sought.
The aim is not to provide a set of definitive
answers to questions of value. Rather, it is to lay out
some issues that need resolution and explore how
such questions are best answered in the context of
a modern, aZuent, and industrialised society in
which government bears much of the responsibility
both for the global resources available for health
services and for their distribution. The goal, then, is
to help clarify the central issues. Although no one
has a monopoly on moral authority in this terrain,
public policy development can best proceed if there
is broad agreement on a set of guiding principles or
policy assumptions.
A pluralist approach for a pluralist
society
There is disagreement about the meaning of equity
among and between the general public, philoso-
phers, political theorists and economists. All
include the word in their vocabularies. There are
some who deny that it has any relevance to public
policy whatsoever and others, even more extreme,
who deny that it has any useful meaning at all. The
first task, therefore, is that of definition, enabling
the reader to form a judgment about the signifi-
cance of equity in public policy toward health and
health care.
Plainly there is no single, universal theory of
equity, but it is widely agreed that equity implies
equality. Unfortunately, there is no accord concern-
ing what should be equal. The absence of an agreed
theory arises out of the absence of a general or
monist theory of morality. There are moral theories
that claim to be general, such as utilitarianism,
though utilitarianism in its classical form was not
directly concerned with equity. But each theory has
to contend with other, often attractive, theories.
Non-utilitarian theories hold, variously, that the
equitable distribution of health care resources is
that which is to the advantage of the least
advantaged person—so-called maximin theory;
that equitable distribution arises out of the duty of
each of us (perhaps by divine fiat) to provide for
others–deontological theory; or that equitable
distribution is the outcome of an equitable
economic and social system–entitlement theory
(for a review of these see Veatch).1 Each of these
theories generates several principles and rules
which conflict with those of the others.
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It therefore seems inevitable that equity issues
are best considered as pluralist.2 We must weigh
and balance rival concepts, rival theories and rival
disciplines, rejecting any completely only where
there is contradiction and only one principle can
survive, through assessing the force of each and
according it a weight commensurate with the
degree to which it is ethically compelling. The pur-
pose of this approach is to narrow the range of pos-
sibilities and to determine the significance of the
diVerent elements.
Why is health care important?
Why be concerned about equity in health care dis-
tribution? Part of the answer is that health care
serves a significant end–individuals’ health–
although health care is not the only means to serve
this end. Moreover, health services serve other
ends: providing information, reassurance, counsel-
ling, certification, legitimisation of sickness states
for those seeking insurance benefits, and a variety of
other services marginally connected with health. It
is, however, the link between health care and health
that is important in equity because health is impor-
tant in ways that the other needs served by health
care are not.
What is this particular significance about health
that raises its status in equity above other services?
The answer seems to be that health, like the cogni-
tive skills developed by educational institutions, is
one of a special set of characteristics (sometimes
called “primary goods”) about whose distribution
people are particularly concerned. Tobin3 uses the
term “specific egalitarianism” because health care
services are regarded as fundamentally necessary to
the good life. Aristotle termed this concept “eudae-
monia”, which is usually taken to mean “flourish-
ing” . This is not the same as the naive utilitarian
notion of “satisfaction”, whose limitations are well
highlighted by John Stuart Mill’s famous remark:
“Better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig
satisfied”4 (though it may also be better to be a
human being dissatisfied than a flourishing pig). In
a very basic sense, one cannot “flourish” at all if one
is dead or diseased. Care that postpones death,
diminishes disease, or eliminates destructive influ-
ences on the quality of living, improves the capacity
for savouring all that life has to oVer, and not
merely its pleasures. Entities such as health derive
equity significance from their ability to enable peo-
ple to “flourish”. Health and sickness are also cul-
turally contingent: the things and attributes you
need to flourish in Britain today may not be the
same as those you needed in the middle ages, nor
are they necessarily the same as are needed now in
Bangladesh.
If it is felt that all residents of a political jurisdic-
tion ought to have equal opportunities for their lives
to flourish, then it follows that health care is one of
the goods and services whose right distribution
must be ensured. Precision in the meaning of flour-
ishing is less critical than agreement that the
concept captures diverse but fundamental aspira-
tions that are dependent on better health.
The idea of fundamental requirements–that
bread is more basic than jam or that needs trump
desires–has received some attention in the econom-
ics literature. For example, Sen5–7 criticises conven-
tional welfare economics for attaching social value
only (a) to goods and services and (b) to the utility
they aVord consumers and externally aVected par-
ties. Economics ought also to attach value to the
capabilities (such as the ability to flourish) that exist
and that can be developed in people.
What is equity? An economist’s view
In essence all equity approaches judge the treat-
ment of individuals inequitable if it is capricious or
relates to “irrelevant” characteristics. Commonly
cited characteristics of this sort include race,
religion, and gender. These may sometimes become
relevant–for example, dietary restrictions and other
prohibitions of some religions are regarded as
legitimate grounds for patients to be treated
diVerently. Equality and equity, and inequality and
inequity, are not the same, although they are
intimately related. Equity in health care requires
that patients who are alike in relevant respects be
treated in like fashion and that patients who are
unlike in relevant respects be treated in appropri-
ately unlike fashion. These requirements corres-
pond to a familiar distinction between horizontal
and vertical equity.
Horizontal equity requires the like treatment of
like individuals and vertical equity requires the
unlike treatment of unlike individuals, in pro-
portion to the diVerences between them. Some of
the ways in which people are generally considered
like or unlike–such as “health” or “need”–are taken
up later. But supposing that “need” is selected as
the only relevant factor, then the two principles
would imply that like needs should receive like
attention and resources (horizontal equity) and that
greater needs should receive greater attention and
resources (vertical equity). Horizontal and vertical
equity considerations apply also to entities other
than health. One closely related entity is the finan-
cial contribution to health care. A horizontal princi-
ple here might be, “equal contributions from
households having an equal ability to pay” and the
corresponding vertical principle would, of course,
be “higher contributions from households with a
higher ability to pay”. Such principles clearly sepa-
rate payment for medical care from the willingness
of households to pay for it. In considering need,
these principles also separate receipt of care from
willingness (as conditioned by ability) to pay. And
the same implications would pertain even if “need”
were not adopted as the distributional principle–so
long as whatever replaced need did not correlate
with ability/willingness to pay.
There is a prevalent view in the wealthy world
that policy ought to concern itself only with the
distribution and redistribution of income (and
wealth), leaving it up to individuals to determine
their preferred consumption of goods and services,
including health care, by appropriate purchases,
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taking into account such taxes and transfers neces-
sary to satisfy the requirements of vertical equity.
There are, however, two diYculties with an equity
focus on purchasing power alone. One is that peo-
ple care more about the fairness of the distribution
of “important” commodities like health care than
they do about other purchasable items,3 so that
even an equalisation of incomes may leave substan-
tial inequities in the “important” entities. The other
is the diYculty of identifying the principles that
ought to guide income distribution independently
of what it is that people can buy with their incomes
and the moral significance of their purchases. For
example, if it is said that health care ought to be
allocated in proportion to need, then the income
redistribution must account for the diVerent needs
of, say, those with ischaemic heart disease, those
needing continuous nursing, those chronically
disabled, and the costs of services required. These
needs and the cost of meeting them must then
become part of the criteria for appropriate income
redistribution. If income distribution policy is
developed independently of the specific concerns
that inequity raises, what is its ethical justification?
On the other hand, if there are specific distributive
concerns, why not focus policy specifically on
them?
Assuming there is a concern for horizontal and
vertical equity in health care, it is clear that the
concept of equity hangs on the meanings attached
to words like “relevant”, “treated”, and “appropri-
ately”. Before taking up these issues, there is
another preparatory issue to be resolved concerning
the level of equity to address through public policy:
should it be the individual level, for example,
doctor-patient, or a more collective level, for exam-
ple, interregional, interclass, or interinstitutional?
Macro and micro equity
Although equity and inequity may be usefully
discussed in terms of the diVerences between indi-
viduals, a distinction needs to be made between
individuals, that is, named persons, and representa-
tive individuals, such as the “typical resident of
Bangladesh”, a “typical patient with ischaemic
heart disease” or a “patient on a waiting list”. It is
important, if equity is significant, for equity to apply
at the individual, or micro level of the doctor-
patient relationship, or at the interface between the
patient and the hospital. For example, it is a
common tenet of medical ethics that doctors ought
to have equal respect for individuals’ autonomy in
all dealings with patients.8 There are also doubtless
more and less equitable ways of scheduling patients
on waiting lists for admission to elective surgery.
The focus here is, however, on macro equity and
particularly on the equity of the distribution of
health care across categories of persons deemed
relevant: for example, the geographic distribution
of resources, across categories of persons, the utili-
sation of services by those in equal need across dif-
ferent socioeconomic groups, or the contribution
made to equity by various medical specialties.
Macro equity is concerned with programmes rather
than with patients and with the decisions leading to
the distribution of resources among client groups.
At the micro level, it is the doctor’s obligation to use
the available resources in ways deemed best for
patients within the requirements of medical ethics.
It is clear, however, that medical ethics, tradition-
ally devised for micro purposes, is inadequate to
determine the equitable distribution of resources
between programmes, specialties, hospitals, or
other health care delivery agencies. One doctor may
be a good judge of the needs of his or her own
patients, but doctors will rarely be in an objective
position to weigh either the rival claims of other
physicians who make demands on behalf of their
patients, or the strength of their own claims
vis-a-vis others. For such macro programmatic
decisions, judgments of a broader kind are
required.
What is ‘relevant’ ‘appropriate’
‘treatment’?
Two problems arise in interpreting “treatment”.
First, not all health care is intended to serve health.
For example, it is possible to conceive of the hotel
services of hospitals being oVered at diVerent qual-
ity levels, without this having much impact on the
eVectiveness of medical care. The range may be
from one star to five, with private and semi-private
rooms or ward-based care, diVerent quality food
menus, and so on. Thus, if equity of distribution
derives from the ethical importance attached to
health, then not all health-aVecting care services
have equal equity significance and may be irrel-
evant. One might, for example, envisage a system in
which individual choice and the power of the purse
(usually via insurance arrangements) determined
the level of hotel services with equity focused on the
distribution specifically of health-aVecting care.
Second, not all health care intended to be eVective
is actually eVective. Even among eVective treat-
ments, moreover, there is usually choice. For exam-
ple, medicine may sometimes be substituted for
surgery (or vice versa), nursing care for physician
care, inpatient for outpatient, prevention for cure,
and so on. Moreover, some treatments that are
eVective may not be cost-eVective. Such treatments
are also irrelevant in equity.
On eYciency grounds, care which is not
cost-eVective ought to be eliminated. Health care
that is not related to the protection, promotion, and
restoration of health may have ample justification in
terms of the satisfaction of consumer preferences,
but it is not to be evaluated by equity criteria.
Is merit ‘relevant’?
Several writers (for example Mooney9) have
enumerated characteristics of individuals relevant
to equity judgments. According to one argument, a
relevant characteristic is the “merit” of individuals
based on judgments about their contribution to
society. Here further judgments might be involved–
for example, whether their economic contribution
is unusually significant or whether they are at a
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stage at which they are supporting young children
or elderly persons–or judgments about their
stewardship of their own health. Horizontal equity,
in the sense of “relevance”, requires there to be
equal treatment for those of equal merit, and verti-
cal equity requires more favourable treatment of
those with greater merit. Merit based on money
strikes directly against several of the “relevancies”
considered below and usually arises from a view of
health care as a service no diVerent in kind from any
other to which monetary wealth gives access. The
question is whether health care is one of the goods
and services within the “rewards system” or not.
(For a systematic account of two archetypical soci-
eties diVerentiated according to these “ideologies”,
see Culyer, Maynard and Williams.10)
The overwhelming evidence is that the citizens of
most countries have thoroughly rejected the
“rewards” approach to health care. This approach
has, however, a residual and continuing presence in
the policy of some physicians of preferring males of
working age to others (including females) when
rationing access. This policy seems ad hoc, however
and is not, so far as I know, enshrined in any state-
ment of public policy.
The second version of the merit argument
(number of dependents) is more frequent, and
again there is patchy evidence that such a policy is
adopted by physicians when defensible priorities
are required. There is also survey evidence that
people attach special significance to the health care
needs of those with dependent children.11 This may,
therefore, be a (vertical) principle of diVerentiation
which a pluralist synthesis might incorporate into
judgments of equity and policies to attain it.
The negative version of the merit argument
dominates and conflicts with several of the other
“relevancies”. Its main role, and it is in this sense
that it is most frequently heard, is to justify
diVerential contributions by smokers. The most
telling practical argument against it is that it is
exceedingly diYcult to think of any aspect of ill
health which is not influenced (albeit indirectly and
only partially) by the lifestyle choices of individuals.
Thus, if it were to be adopted as a relevant princi-
ple for equitable distribution, it would apply very
widely, and there would be formidable problems in
assessing the “contribution” of each individual’s
past negligence to current ill health and penalising
each accordingly’.
Need is relevant
Medical care is a commonly cited example of a
service that ought to be distributed according to
“need”.12–14 Let us suppose that what we mean when
we say that something is needed is that it is needed
for what it is able to accomplish. The thing asserted
to be needed is instrumental–a necessary condition
if a more ultimate objective is to be met. The view
that “need” must be an instrumental concept has
been strongly argued by Barry15 and Flew.16 It has
been opposed by others (for example Miller,17
Thomson18) on the grounds that some statements
using the word “need” are intrinsic and elliptical, or
imply an objective which would be trivial to make
explicit. For example, the statement: “surgeons
need manual dexterity” is hardly elucidated by ask-
ing “why”, for the answer might well be that
“surgeons need manual dexterity in order to be
surgeons”. Similarly the statement: “Anthony
needs open-heart surgery” is hardly elucidated by
adding: “if he is to live”.
The main reason for objecting to unsubstanti-
ated assertions of need is that they assume, rather
than inquire whether, the thing needed really is
necessary. For example, modern technology may
make an eVective surgeon less dependent on
manual dexterity. Therefore, if we are to stipulate
the skills surgeons ought to have, it becomes
important to be explicit in determining how
surgeons should be trained. Or, if we’re deciding on
Anthony’s treatment, we really do need to know
whether open-heart surgery is appropriate for him,
what the risks are, what the probability of success is,
and what alternative actions might be taken.
Moreover, these assertions assume that the objec-
tive really is the one sought. If the operation is likely
to extend Anthony’s life, will it do so only at the cost
of a much lower quality of life? Or, how small must
the probability of perioperative death be before
Anthony or the doctor judges the risk worth taking?
The assertion that this or that is “needed”, even
though its eVectiveness may be disputed or
unknown and even though the end sought may rank
low in the priorities of those allocating resources, is
a commonplace of medical politics. At the risk of
redundancy then, there is much to be said for
explicitness about the instrumentality of any
resources asserted to be needed.
Capacity to benefit
The word “need” has a particular moral force, con-
veying the impression that needs ought to receive a
higher priority than mere wants. This morally com-
pelling aspect of “need” provides a further impetus
for inquiry into the objectives served by whatever is
asserted to be needed. The instrumental element of
“need” is factual. It is true or false or disputable at
a factual level, but even if the need is true, it doesn’t
follow that it ought to be met at public expense.
Whatever is morally compelling about a need must
come from the end served. Let us assume that there
can be a need for health services only if there are
grounds for believing that these services will
enhance health, prevent its deterioration, or post-
pone death. These are the benefits sought from
health care, and it follows that a need for health care
can exist only when there is a capacity to
benefit.12 19 20 It is rare, however, to have a fixed and
unique technology of treatment. Thus, of the vari-
ous possibilities available, the treatment needed is
that judged to be the most appropriate in the
particular circumstances of the case, which is that
which is the most cost-eVective. The amount
needed is that suYcient to exhaust capacity to ben-
efit. This definition captures the instrumental
nature of need by defining it in terms of what is
needed–resources. It also relates the need for
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resources to the moral objective sought–health for
“flourishing”–which gives need its special moral
status. It also defines a finite quantum of need
(namely that which exhausts capacity to benefit)
without building in distributional values about how
much need ought to be met, a question still to be
resolved.
As well as saying that health care is needed, one
might say that health is needed, asserting another
instrumentality, that health itself is needed to
achieve some more ultimate state, such as the
enjoyment of a “flourishing” life. It is possible to
imagine some kind of regression whereby care is
needed to have health, and health is needed to
flourish, and flourishing is needed to have... . This
regression is not, however, infinite. It stops when an
ultimate objective is reached, an objective that is
not needed for anything further. It might reason-
ably stop with “flourishing”. The ultimate end is
ethical in its own right, and this moral worth is
transmitted back down the line to all the things
which are necessary for its attainment. It is the end
that imbues “need” with moral urgency and aVords
it priority over mere demands. It is also the crucial
criterion in determining whether, and which, needs
ought to be met.
Culturally determined
The use of the word “need” is often categorical or
absolute and the need described ought therefore to
be met categorically and absolutely. However,
“health” is not categorical or absolute. It is a
variable, for example, in functioning, activities of
daily living, experience of pain, mobility and
longevity and it is also largely culturally
determined–both as regards the pathologies re-
garded as detrimental to a flourishing life in a par-
ticular community at a particular time and as
regards the meaning of “flourishing”. An extreme
example of a clinical disease that was not regarded
by some as “being ill” was pinto (dichromatic
spirochetosis), a skin disease so prevalent among
some South American tribes that the few single
men not aZicted were regarded as pathological to
the point of being excluded from marriage.
Another sort of extremism to which a categorical
approach is prone, is illustrated by Harris21: “Life
saving has priority over life-enhancement and ... we
should first allocate resources to those areas where
they are immediately needed to save life and only
when this is done should the remainder be allocated
to alleviating non-fatal conditions.” Harris’s point is
made without qualification. Thus the smallest
possibility of the shortest extension to the most
miserable of lives is to receive priority over the most
sure and massive improvement in the quality of a
life already expected to be long. Such is the absurd
(even cruel) possibility inherent in a devotion to
absolutism: a moral commitment held irrespective
of its consequences and the harm those conse-
quences inflict.
Despite these remarks, it is clear that the usage of
the word “need” implies that the end served by the
services held to be needed is particularly weighty.
Therefore, in discussing health policy, even if we
draw back from absolutism, we ought nevertheless
to restrict the word “need” to those instrumentali-
ties eVective in promoting the “important” at-
tributes required for “flourishing”.
Five important implications of “need”
The arguments just presented have five important
and potentially radical implications.
First, need and ill health are not synonyms, and
therefore one should not imagine that, in measur-
ing the latter, one is also measuring the former. The
only kind of health care that can be held to be
needed is that which promotes health or reduces/
postpones deteriorations in health. This view
contrasts sharply with a common view that
identifies need with a current health or ill health state.
For example, Daniels22 concludes with a definition
of health in terms of an individual’s impairment
within what he calls the “normal opportunity
range” for a person’s life plans. But the weight of
need then depends, not on the ability of health care
to restore the range or compensate for its
curtailment, but on the magnitude of the existing
curtailment. By this definition, someone can need
health care even though health care can make no
contribution to the restoration or expansion of the
range.
According to the definition advanced here, a
need exists over the whole range of cost-eVective
health, wherever the marginal product (to use the
economist’s term) of care is positive in terms of
health. Imagine, for example, that the capacity of a
population to benefit from health care is ordered so
that the person with the highest capacity to benefit
is placed first in a parade, the person with the next
highest capacity is placed second, and so on until
individuals with zero capacity are reached. Only the
individuals ahead of those with zero capacity are in
need. Or, considering a single individual, imagine
that by the application of one “unit” of health care,
a given “pile” of health can be obtained and that we
order incremental units in such a fashion that the
biggest pile per unit is placed on the left, the next
biggest immediately to its right, and so on until the
piles have become tiny. Need exists only in the
range where the piles are visible.
Second, capacity to benefit diVers from need. On the
one hand, capacity to benefit is defined in terms of
outputs (improved health compared to what would
have happened without the health care interven-
tion). On the other hand, need is defined as the
resources, valued in expenditure terms, required to
exhaust capacity to benefit. It is possible, in a com-
parison of two individuals, for their capacities to
benefit to diVer but to be exhausted by the same
expenditure on each. Hence the need for resources,
as measured by expenditure, is the same, even
though capacity to benefit is not. The two concepts
are measured in diVerent dimensions and do not
necessarily coincide. Unfortunately, we know far
too little about capacities to benefit and about cost-
eVective packages of care.
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Third, need is forward- rather than backward-
looking. It is prospective rather than retrospective. It
emphasises what can be done for people rather than
what has previously happened to them or what their
current situation is. Past and present are important
only in so far as they may aVect what can be done.
Capacity to benefit is the diVerence between what a
person’s health is predicted to be over a period of
time with and without care. It is not a before-and-
after but a with-and-without comparison. Again,
the inadequacy of a definition of need based only
on current sickness, impairment or disability, is
thrown into sharp relief. So, too, is the need for evi-
dence about eVectiveness.
There is evidence that not all health care is eVec-
tive, let alone cost-eVective, in the sense either that a
patient’s health is better with it than without it or that
a given improvement is achieved with the least use of
resources (see, for example Rachlis and Kushner.23)
There are large variations in the rates of medical
intervention, not only between diVerent health care
systems but also within them (for example McPher-
son,24 McPherson, Wennberg, Hovind and CliVord,25
Wennberg and Gittlesohn,26 and Sanders, Coulter,
McPherson.27) These variations often reflect what
has become known as a “surgical signature” in which
the uncertainties, subjective judgments and prefer-
ences of particular physicians, vary. They are
sometimes indicators of wasteful use of resources.
Given the importance of need in considerations of
equity, the elimination of ineVective practices is
highly desirable. Such practices indicate that need is
not being taken suYciently seriously and that wasted
resources could be redeployed, with no loss of
patients’ health, to redress inequities at the same level
of expenditure. A better empirical basis for a macro
assessment of the eVectiveness of medical care is
therefore essential.
Fourth, it will often be equitable for some needs to go
unmet. This implication arises out of resource con-
straints. If resources are insuYcient to exhaust all
capacities to benefit and if it is deemed eYcient,
equitable, and otherwise desirable not to divert
resources from other (non-health) uses, then the
question arises as to what is the most equitable way
of distributing existing resources across the range of
needs. Some individuals may receive none and
those who receive some may not receive all they
need. Either can be compatible with equitable
resource allocation.
Incomplete equity principle
Fifth, equal access is an incomplete equity principle.
Access is probably best interpreted in terms of the
costs, financial and other, to patients of using health
care services. If equity requires that services go only
to those who need them, then access (in the sense of
“gaining admission” to the system in order for
needs to be assessed) is plainly implied, so that
needs can be assessed. Any impediments that
discriminate between patients or that prevent such
assessment will create inequity. Access, too, is
instrumental. Equitable access is not an end in
itself. Just as need is instrumental, in the sense of
the resources necessary to eliminate capacity to
benefit, access too, in the sense of “gaining admis-
sion”, is instrumental so that needs can be assessed
and then met equitably. However, access beyond
the assessment stage is also important if needs are
to be met. But whereas access for assessment
requires equality for all who may have a capacity to
benefit (one doesn’t know until the case has been
assessed), further access, which will depend upon
the assessed needs, should be related to needs. How
access should be related to needs depends, of
course, on how needs are to be equitably met.
Meeting needs equitably
Is it true that (as Miller17 claims) “egalitarians are
committed to the view that justice consists (mini-
mally) in a distribution of resources according to
need”? Or more generally, what kind of equality is
right for a health care system which emphasises
need? Miller’s claim is equivalent to the needs
version of horizontal and vertical equity–those in
equal need ought to be treated equally and those in
greater need ought to be treated in proportion to the
greater need. It is quite easy to see that macro
resource distribution in proportion to need conflicts
with the foundations upon which the ethically com-
pelling nature of need rests. Specifically, distribution
according to need may worsen the distribution of
health and, at best, will improve it only incidentally.
Some imaginary cases will demonstrate this conflict.
In the first case, Anthony and Betty are judged to
be equally sick and also to have an equal capacity to
benefit. The resources available will permit either
Anthony or Betty, but not both, to be restored to full
health, and the same resource allocation for each is
needed to accomplish this. An equal distribution of
resources between the two will aVord to each an
equal increment in health. Since they started out
with identical health states, the end state will also be
identical. Here, then, is a case which is solidly
egalitarian in that the individuals began equal, have
equal capacities to benefit, have equal needs, are
treated equally, and end up equal, though neither
have their needs fully met. The road to equity is
clearly signposted.
In the second case, Charlie and Dawn, too, start
oV with equal ill health. Suppose also that the
amount of care (measured as expenditure) required
to eliminate the capacity of each to benefit is the
same–their need is equal–and, as before, that
resources are insuYcient for each to receive the
maximum benefit of which he or she is capable. But
suppose now, that, whereas Dawn can be restored
to full health with the available technology and
resources, Charlie’s health can be only modestly
improved. In this case, since need is the same, the
horizontal equity principle requires expenditure to
be divided equally between them. However, since
Dawn’s capacity to benefit is higher than Charlie’s,
she will receive a larger increment of health. Since
the two started oV with the same health, the result
is that Dawn finishes up healthier than Charlie.
Moreover, the reason for this is not that Charlie has
exhausted his capacity to benefit, but that some
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resources which would benefit him are being
devoted to the care of Dawn. Here the starting
states of health were equal (which some may say is
“need”), “need” in the sense advocated here was
equal, but the outcome is a more unequal distribu-
tion of health.
There are several other possible conflicts between
equity in terms of meeting needs and equity in terms
of the final distribution of health. It is quite possible,
in a starting situation of unequal health (unlike the
case just discussed), to have a needs-based distribu-
tion of health care that actually exacerbates this ini-
tial inequality.28 29 The important point is that there
can be conflict between rules such as “distribution
according to need”, “distribution according to
capacity to benefit”, “distribution according to initial
ill health”, and “distribution designed to reduce
inequalities in health”. It is therefore necessary,
except in special cases that cannot usually be
expected, to choose between rival principles.
Distribution of health
Is there any reason to prefer any one of these prin-
ciples over the others? Recall that the fundamental
reason for caring about the distribution of health
care is because of its eVect on health, the ethical
significance of which, hinges, in turn, on its role as
a foundation for the flourishing of individuals in
society. If this is indeed the reason for concern
about the distribution of health care, then it is per-
verse to select need, capacity to benefit, or initial
health as the characteristic in proportion to which
health care should be allocated. None of these will
necessarily result in the more equal distribution of
health that is the true ethical imperative. They are
not all equally faulty, although none is as egalitarian
as it may initially have seemed. Distribution
according to initial ill health is most likely to be
egregiously inequitable, since it may waste substan-
tial resources on those who will derive no benefit
whatever while denying their application to the
putting right of rectifiable inequalities. Distribution
according to capacity to benefit will produce
anomalies when the relatively healthy have higher
capacities to benefit. Even distribution according to
need is flawed. What ought to dominate is the
distribution of health and how health care interven-
tions can alter that for the better.
An equitable health care policy should seek to
reduce the inequality in health (life expectation, self-
reported morbidity, quality of life in terms of
personal and social functioning) at every stage of the
life-cycle. Such a policy must meet needs, but in
proportion to the “distance’ each individual is from
the population average. Constraints may be desir-
able, some of which might be based on merit
arguments. Moreover, it is probably not ethical to
seek greater equality of health by reducing the health
of the already relatively healthy. There may be com-
promises between the ethical desiderata of equity
and eYciency in cases where egalitarian policies
could reduce the variance of health only by causing
total health to deteriorate. Such is pluralism. But the
principle underlying the selection of needs to be met
will not be a simple, proportionate one in terms of
needs. Instead, needs will be met so as to reduce the
dispersion of ill health in the community.
It also follows that judgments about some of the
process-oriented conceptions of equity in health
services, such as equity of opportunity to consume
and equity of access, do not translate into equality
of these processes, but have to be informed by
judgments related to the contribution each can
make to the ultimate objective of an equitable and,
as far as possible, equal distribution of health. In
judgments, for example, about the equity of
introducing (further) user charges or about distrib-
uting health care facilities so that the time and
transport costs of attending the facilities are
reduced for patients, a decision has to be made as to
whether such policies are conducive to meeting
those needs that contribute most to reducing
inequalities in health.
It is unlikely that precision is possible in such
judgments, but the force of equity insists that these
are the relevant considerations. The fact that there
will never be suYcient information for the judg-
ments to be reached with absolute confidence
should not stand in the way of policies which push
the system in the direction that equity demands.
The perfect should not be allowed to become the
enemy of the merely good.
Who should make these judgments about needs
and the best ways of meeting them? Ultimately, it
ought to be policy-makers accountable to the public,
because the principles and priorities they select are
quintessentially political matters of public policy
(and they may be well advised to consult the public
on key matters of value). But the concept of need has
as one crucial ingredient the eVectiveness of health
care, and about this top-level policy makers may be
expected to know little. Conversely, those who know
a lot about eVectiveness are ill-suited, through lack of
accountability and training, to make the value judg-
ments required in trading oV the rival claims of
articulate and powerful provider interests within the
health care system. It is therefore clear that
judgments about need and meeting needs at the
macro level have to be made in a multidisciplinary
fashion and, given their significance for public policy,
in a publicly accountable way.
From theory to policy
In this section, I tease out what seem to be the
practical implications for policy of the foregoing.
The implications are organised into four groups:
policy assumptions; target groups; information, and
research.
POLICY ASSUMPTIONS
The first set of implications relates to the underly-
ing “mind set” that the foregoing seem to require.
(a) There may be no single, overriding, equity
principle to guide resource distributions.
Policy-makers should be prepared to juggle
with several, for example by including merit as
well as equality of health.
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(b) In view of the possibility of multiple depriva-
tion, policy-makers should watch for compen-
sating inequities in non-health areas in terms of
health care and vice versa.
(c) Need should be seen as a necessary condition for
the receipt of equitably distributed public care.
(d) Equity requires, in the first instance, equal and
universal access for assessment, especially in
primary and emergency services; access for
“approved” treatments ought to be unequal.
(e) “Approved” treatments are those that are
needed and that make the most contribution to
reducing inequalities in health.
(f) Slavish devotion to time-honoured principles of
allocation in proportion to need and equal uni-
versal access should be avoided. They are
misleading principles.
TARGET GROUPS
The next few implications relate to what I
conjecture to be helpful ways of categorising
patients and programmes.
(a) Since multiple deprivation is likely to prevail,
there needs to be a powerful focus in
policy-making and management structures so
that a broad view of “basic goods” can be taken,
their distributions monitored over time, and
policies developed and likewise monitored. The
simplest, though imperfect, way of doing this is
to monitor the distribution of health, or ill
health, and other significant “basics” by family,
household, or by income, socioeconomic class,
or known “risk factors” such as ethnicity, single
parenthood, disability, and exposure to envi-
ronmental hazards.
(b) Geographical distribution is usually an impor-
tant dimension because regions, as well as
individuals, can be multiply deprived and
because there are usually significant variations
in the ill health and in the avoidable or remedi-
able ill health of regions.
(c) Medical specialties are important provider
groups, some of which speak with voices more
powerful than others. However, the potential of
each to impact favourably on health is conjec-
tural, while the significance of each for contrib-
uting to greater equality in health has hardly
been investigated at all. Finding out more
should be a priority.
(d) Such popular slogans as “prevention is better
than cure” or “community care is better than
institutional” ought to be tested in terms of the
impact on the distribution of health that
expansions or contractions might have, in
addition to the prime requirement that each
should have demonstrable eVectiveness.
(e) Simply because of their vulnerability, those
members of the community most at risk from
changes in health care policy and those least
likely to take advantage of the eVective services
available should be identified.
INFORMATION
Equity, like eYciency, demands particular forms of
knowledge for its implementation. Moreover, the
knowledge each demands is essentially the same.
The main items are:
(a) Information on the current distribution of
resources and health (or sickness) in relation to
“target groups” above and any other groups
perceived as ethically significant. Prior agree-
ment on the meaning of “health” and “sick-
ness” is necessary as is agreement on the
appropriate statistical measures of inequality to
be employed.
(b) Informed judgments about the eVect of
changes in resource distribution on the health
of individuals and especially target groups.
(c) Information on the time and monetary costs
faced by patients in accessing the system, and
subsequently using this information to form
judgments about the impact of user-charges,
long travel times, and so on.
RESEARCH
The principal types of research needed are as
follows:
(a) Data and information collection of the types
enumerated above.
(b) Further research into concepts and theories of
equity and eYciency directed at the policy and
management needs of the ministry of health
and other related divisions of government and
the health services.
(c) More research into the non-health care deter-
minants of health, which may have a greater
(and more cost-eVective) impact on health than
health care.
(d) Further epidemiological and economic studies
into eVectiveness and cost-eVectiveness, in-
cluding the development and refinement of
outcome measures of health for use at both
macro and micro levels. A major priority ought
to be research directed at the quantification of
the potential health gains from alternative
delivery strategies, changes in programmes
defined by disease and changes in programmes
defined by targeted groups. Research into
“avoidable deaths” may provide a rough but
workable set of clues as to where there are
major, unexploited health improvements. An
immediate task might be to commission a
comprehensive and authoritative review of the
existing epidemiological evidence on the rela-
tive cost-eVectiveness of medical, including
diagnostic, procedures.
(e) Research into the actual distributions of health
and sickness: performed in advance of policy
initiatives so that the initiatives be informed by
the results; and routinely performed at an
aggregate level for key groups, to monitor
distributional changes over time and their likely
determinants.
(f) Research into appropriate statistical measures
of inequality and into practical survey/census
procedures, with the empirical measures based
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on agreed concepts (health, equity, need,
access, etc) and tested for content validity.
These policy proposals constitute a formidable
agenda. The question is, of course, whether it is felt
to be worthwhile welding the talent that usually
exists in the developed world into a purposeful pro-
gramme of interrelated and multidisciplinary
activity–a programme in which policy and statistical
branches of government, researchers, health care
providers, health care users, carers and the public at
large, are all interwoven and share a common
purpose. Some Perestroika. Lots of Glasnost. And the
goal?–the most eYcient, humane, and equitable
health care system yet devised by humankind!
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